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FORECLOSURE BY SALE BY PUBLIC TRUSTEE
OF DEEDS OF TRUST IN COLORADO
BY PERCY S. MORRIS
of the Denver Bar
EDITOR'S NOTE: This article was originally published in the November 1936
issue of Dicta. It is now published as revised by Mr. Morris to include decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court and amendments of the statutes
during the intervening fifteen years and a discussion of the procedure under
Rule 120, which was adopted after the original article appeared.

Ever since the inception "of real estate conveyancing" in
Colorado, deeds of trust have been in common use. A deed of trust,
as herein mentioned, is an instrument which by its terms conveys
real estate to a grantee, as trustee, as security for an indebtedness,
with power given by the instrument to the trustee to sell the property at public sale upon certain notice in the event of default in
the payment of the debt and to convey the property to the purchaser at such sale and apply the proceeds upon the indebtedness.
Until 1894 deeds of trust executed in Colorado wer to individuals as trustees and under their provisions the trustee was
given the power to sell the property at public sale, after advertising the sale for a period specified in the deed of trust, and execute
a trustee's deed conveying the property to the purchaser immediately upon the sale being held and the highest bid being accepted,
there being no right of redemption from such sale.
In 1894 a statute was passed creating the office of Public
Trustee in each county in the state and containing provisions regarding the method of the foreclosure by advertisement and sale
by the Public Trustee of deeds of trust executed to the Public
Trustee and providing the time and manner of redemption from
such sale. That statute further provided that from and after its
passage all deeds of trust given to secure indebtedness of any kind
shall name as trustee the Public Trustee and that any deed of trust
that shall name any other person as trustee therein shall be deemed
and taken to be a mortgage and foreclosed only as mortgages were
then foreclosed in and through the courts (1935 Colorado Statutes
Annotated, Chapter 40 Section 52, et seq.). This act was approved March 8, 1894, and became effective on that date.
Therefore any deed of trust executed to a private trustee prior
to the passage of the 1894 act could be foreclosed by advertisement
and sale by such private trustee without any right of redemption
from the sale, and this was true even though the time of payment
of the indebtedness secured thereby was extended after the passage of the 1894 act (Brewer v. Harrison, 27 Colo. 349, 62 Pac.
224; Smissaert v. The PrudentialInsurance Co., 15 Colo. App. 442,
62 Pac. 967). Deeds of trust to private trustees executed after the
passage of the 1894 Act could not be foreclosed by advertisement
and sale by the trustee but could be foreclosed only as mortgages by
suit in court.
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Deeds of trust executed to the Public Trustee may be foreclosed as mortgages by judicial proceedings (Neikirk v. Boulder
National Bank, 53 Colo. 350, 353, 127 Pac. 137) or they may be
foreclosed by advertisement and sale by the Public Trustee without the expense, the delay, and the necessity of securing service
of summons which would be required if the foreclosure had to be
by a suit in court.
The Colorado statutes prescribe various successive steps
in the proceedings for foreclosure of a deed of trust to the
Public Trustee by advertisement and sale by the Public Trustee
from the time such proceedings are commenced until, by the execution and delivery of the Public Trustee's Deed, the foreclosure is
completed. The purpose of this article is to state and discuss the
steps in such proceedings in their order so as to provide a guide
in the handling of such proceedings and assist in guarding against
the omission of some necessary step or the doing in an incorrect
manner of any of the acts necessary to constitute a valid foreclosure. Much of what is contained herein may be considered elementary, but if all of the steps in the foreclosure are to be outlined, it is necessary that much that is elementary be mentioned.
The courts hold that the provisions of the deed of trust and
statutes relating to the proceedings for the foreclosure by sale of
the deed of trust must be strictly followed (59 C.J.S. 917-918;
Stephens v. Clay, 17 Colo. 489, 492, 30 Pac. 43; Lewis v. Hamilton,
26 Colo. 263, 267, 58 Pac. 196; Keim v. Axelson, 74 Colo. 459, 461462, 222 Pac. 651). Tn this connection- it is to h horne in mind
that this method of foreclosure is one which cuts out the interests
of the owner and all subsequent grantees and encumbrancees without giving them their "day in court." And our Supreme Court has
held that, once a private trustee has executed and delivered his
trustee's deed, all of his powers in connection with the deed of
trust and its foreclosure are exhausted, even though the proceedings which he had taken in the foreclosure were defective and the
interests of the maker of the deed of trust or his successors in
interest were not cut out by them (Stephens v. Clay, supra, Keim
v. Axelson, supra) and the same rule has been applied to the Public
Trustee (Carlson v. Howes, 69 Colo. 246, 247-248, 193 Pac. 490).
In a later decision the Supreme Court held that where the trustee
gave a defective deed he could afterwards give a corrected one
(Brockman v. DiGiacomo, 76 Colo. 428, 430-431, 232 Pac. 670).
If the foreclosure proceedings by the Public Trustee have not been
properly conducted, it is questionable whether, after he has executed and delivered his Public Trustee's Deed, he can go back and
correct any of the steps prior to the execution of his Public Trustee's Deed or whether he can start the foreclosure proceeding over.
It will therefore be seen how important it is that each and every
step in the proceedings to foreclose by advertisement and sale of a
deed of trust be taken and followed with the utmost care and in
strict compliance with the provisions of the statute.
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The Colorado Supreme Court has held in a number of cases
that, although the statute of limitations may have barred an action
on the debt secured by the deed of trust, a proceeding for foreclosure of the deed of trust by advertisement and sale is not barred.
(Holmquist v. Gilbert, 41 Colo. 113, 92 Pac. 232; Foot v. Burr, 41
Colo. 192, 92 Pac. 236; McClung v.Graham, 45 Colo. 268, 269, 100
Pac. 411; Walters v. Webster, 52 Colo. 549, 552, 123 Pac. 952).
Subsequent to the last of these decisions, the Legislature in 1927
adopted a statute providing that the lien created by any instrument shall be extinguished at the same time that the right to
commence a suit to enforce payment of the indebtedness secured
by the lien is barred by any statute of limitation of this state (1927
S. L. 598, sec. 27; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 133) and another statute
which, as amended, provides that the lien created by any instrument shall not remain a lien upon the real estate for a period
longer than fifteen years after the final payment of principal is
due and payable as shown by the recorded instrument unless it is
extended and the lien and notice thereof renewed and continued by
the recording, during such fifteen years, of an instrument of extension (1927 S. L. 593-598, secs. 16-28; 1933 S. L. 798-802; 1935
C.S.A. Ch. 40 secs. 122-134). Although these statutes were mentioned and discussed in Birkby v. Wilson, 92 Colo. 281, 19 Pac.
(2d) 490, no decision of our Supreme Court has, up to the present
time, passed upon the effect of these statutes upon foreclosure of
deeds of trust by sale by the Public Trustee.
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATES

Formerly, if the deed of trust constituted a lien or encumbrance upon property owned by decedent at the date of his death
or secured an indebtedness constituting a claim against the estate
of a deceased person, foreclosure by sale by the Public Trustee of
such deed of trust could be had during the year following the death
of such person only by express permission of the Probate Court,
and without such permission the deed of trust could be foreclosed
by sale by the Public Trustee only after the expiration of one year
from the death of said person. (Section 5344 1921 Colorado Compiled Laws; 1935 C.S.A. original Volume 4, Ch. 176 sec. 208). The
same statute by its terms applied to a deed of trust constituting a
lien or encumbrance upon property owned by a mental incompetent
at the date of the adjudication of his mental incompetency or which
secures an indebtedness constituting a claim against the estate
of a mental incompetent. However, a statute passed in 1931 (1931
S. L. 793) and amended in 1939 (1939 S. L. 793-794, 1935 C.S.A.
Suppl. Ch. 40 secs, 65-68) has removed such restrictions. A companion amendment (1939 S. L. 283, 1945 S. L. 740, 1935 C.S.A.
replacement Volume 4B, Ch. 176 sec. 208) provides that no deficiency claim or judgment shall be made or allowed against the
estate of any incompetent person or decedent where sale in foreclosure of the mortgage, deed of trust or other instrument securing
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the indebtedness shall have been had or made, either by sale by
the Public Truste or in foreclosure by suit, where the foreclosure
sale shall have been made subsequent to the adjudication of mental
incompetency of the incompetent person or subsequent to the death
of the decedent unless, prior to such foreclosure sale, the claim shall
have been filed in such estate prior to the expiration of the time
within which creditors may file claims of the fifth class and unless,
prior to such foreclosure sale, either such claim shall have been
allowed in the estate or permission to sell in such foreclosure sale
shall have been granted by the Court in which the estate is being
administered. See Brothe v. Zaiss, 116 Colo. 472, 183 Pac. (2d)
561. This relates only to the allowance in the estate proceedings
of the claim for the deficiency remaining after the foreclosure sale
has been held and has nothing to do with the proceedings for the
foreclosure of the encumbrance.
120
Since 1940, it has been necessary, in order that the title derived
through a Public Trustee's Deed may be considered marketable,
that there be "an order of sale previously granted by the court and
a return thereto made and approved by the court." The quoted
language was contained in sec. 302 (3) of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940; the language of the entire paragraph (3)
is set out in the Note following Rule 120. Said sec. 302 was amended
October 6, 1942 and the pertinent portions of such section, as so
amended, are as follows: "(1) The provisions of this section shall
apply only to obligations secured by mortgage, trust deed, or othei
security in the nature of a mortgage upon real or personal property owned by a person in military service at the commencement
of the period of military service and still so owned by him which
obligations originated prior to such person's period of military
service. * * * (3) No sale, foreclosure, or seizure of property for
nonpayment of any sum due under any such obligation, or for any
other breach of the terms thereof, whether under a power of sale,
under a judgment entered upon warrant of attorney to confess judgment contained therein, or otherwise, shall be valid if made after
the date of enactment of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
Amendments of 1942 and during the period of military service or
within three months thereafter, except pursuant to an agreement
as provided in section .107, unless upon an order previously granted
by the court and a return thereto made and approved by the court."
U.S.C.A. Title 50 Appendix sec. 532.
Since, in their very nature, the instruments in the Recorder's
office shown by the abstract of title do not indicate whether or not
the persons owning the property or holding an encumbrance thereon were or are in military service and, if they were or are, whether
the obligations originated prior to the military service, it is essential to the marketability of the title derived through the sale by the
Public Trustee that the provisions of said section 302 be complied
COURT PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE
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with, even though the attorney supervising the foreclosure proceedings knows positively that no person owning an interest in
the property or holding a lien upon it is or has been in military
service. This is because the facts known to such attorney can not
be made to appear on the records in the Recorder's office and
attorneys examining the title in the future will not know, and
can not be expected to know, whether any of such interested persons were or were not in military service, and therefore they can
not say that it was not necessary to secure the order and have
return of sale made to and approved by the court.
PURPOSE AND PROVISIONS OF RULE

When the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act was enacted,
there was no procedure provided by any act of Congress or any
Colorado statute or any provision in the then effective Colorado
Code of Civil Procedure for the securing of the order authorizing
the sale and for the making and approval of the return of sale. In
order to remedy this deficiency and to provide a specific method
of procedure, by the following of which the provisions of section
302 (3) could be complied with and the necessary court orders
secured with a minimum of labor, delay and expense consistent
with due process of law, the Revision Committee (which submitted
to the Colorado Supreme Court for its consideration the Rules of
Civil Procedure which, with some modifications, the Court adopted
on January 6, 1941) included in such Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 120, which was entitled "Orders Authorizing Sales Under
Powers." The Supreme Court adopted this rule by a special order
entered October 28, 1940. On May 17, 1951 the Court adopted an
amendment of paragraph (b) of such rule. The only change made
by such amendment was in the provision specifying what persons
having an interest in the real estate are to be named in the motion.
The Committee Note states that such amendment "makes the language of the rule follow more closely the language of Sec. 64,
Ch. 40, 1935 C.S.A., which governs the mailing by the Public Trustee of copies of the notice of the foreclosure sale, and makes it
clear that the persons to whom the clerk is, under the rule, to mail
copies of the notice of the hearing on the motion for order authorizing the sale and the addresses to which they are to be mailed are
identical with the persons to whom the Public Trustee is, under
said Sec. 64, to mail copies of the notice of sale and the addresses
to which they are to be mailed."
The procedure required by Rule 120 for securing an order
of court authorizing the sale under the power of sale contained in
a deed of trust to the Public Trustee upon real estate is simple and
consists of the following: the filing in any court of record by an
interested person (who is usually the holder of the indebtedness
secured by the deed of trust) of a motion asking for such order;
the motion must be verified by the oath of the interested person
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filing it or of someone in his behalf (who may be his attorney) ;
the motion must describe the deed of trust and the property sought
to be sold thereunder and must state the names of those persons
who were the grantor, or grantors, in the deed of trust and of those
persons who appear to have acquired a record interest in such real
estate, subsequent to the recording of the deed of trust, and the
address of each such person as such address is given in the recorded instrument; if no address of one of such persons is stated
in the motion, the motion must state that his address is unknown;
the court enters an order fixing the time and place for the hearing
of the motion; the clerk then issues a notice containing a description of the deed of trust and of the real estate sought to be sold
thereunder and the time and place of the hearing and stating that
an order is asked authorizing a sale of said property under the
power of sale contained in the deed of trust; the notice is served
by the clerk mailing, not less than ten days before the hearing,
a copy thereof to each person stated in the motion as having any
interest in the real estate whose address is stated in the motion
and by the clerk posting, not less than ten days before the hearing,
a copy thereof in a prominent place in his office; the mailing and
posting is evidenced by the certificate of the clerk; no motions or
pleadings are required or permitted to be filed by anyone other
than the person who filed the motion; at the time and place set for
the hearing or to which the hearing may be continued, the court
examines such affidavits as may have been filed and hears such
testimony as may be offered and then summarily determines the
motion and grants or denies it and enters an order accordingly;
at any time before the entry of the order the court may require
such additional notice as it may see fit; if the court authorizes the
sale, it must require a return of such sale to be made to it for its
approval; after the sale has been made, a return of such sale is
filed with the court and, if the court sees fit to do so, it enters an
order approving the sale.
RECITALS AS TO MILITARY SERVICE

The provisions of the rule are so simple and so specific and
detailed that only a few additional comments are required.
The rule does not expressly require that the motion state any
facts with reference to military service of the persons named in
the motion. Nevertheless, it is advisable that it be stated in the
motion, as to each of such persons, either: that he is in military
service or was in military service during the preceding three
months; or that he is not in military service and was not in military
service during the preceding three months and the facts showing
same; or that the person filing the motion (and, if it is verified by
someone on his behalf, the person verifying it) is not able to determine whether he is in military service or has been in military
service during the preceding three months. This is because the
sole purpose of the proceeding is to comply with the requirements
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of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and the purpose of
that Act is to secure consideration by the court of the interests of
those persons having an interest in the real estate involved who
may be in military service or may have been within the preceding
three months and the court, for these reasons, may well require
that it be advised of all facts known to the person filing the motion
and those acting in his behalf relating to the military service of
those who have an interest in the property which would be cut
out of the Public Trustee's deed based upon the sale.
Whitaker v. Hearnsberger
Furthermore, the stating of such facts in the motion will avoid
any implication from the decision in Whitaker v. Hearnsberger
(1951) -..----- Colo -...----- , 23 Pac. (2d) 389, that the foreclosure is
invalid because such facts were not stated. In that case, an action
was brought to secure an injunction upon the ground, among others,
that, in the proceeding under Rule 129, the court was not advised as
to the status as a member of the armed forces of one of the owners
of the property. The dismissal of the action was affirmed by the
Supreme Court upon the following grounds: The Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 "by its plain provisions does not
prevent the foreclosure of security for any obligation pursuant
to a written agreement of the parties executed during the period of
military service, as was here the case"; and "There is here no
contention that notice was not given as required by Rule 120, and
if, as now urged, full information with regard to Whitaker's known
military service and residence was not disclosed to the court in
the motion and hearing under Rule 120, neverthless, full disclosure
was made in the complaint in this action, as well as at the hearings
for injunction therein, and the trial court after full inquiry denied
relief. In view of the fact that Whitakers had ample advance
notice of their transfer to the Philippines, with full opportunity
to leave forwarding address and make any needed arrangements
for payments on their note, and with no suggestion of financial
handicap or necessary delay in making such payments as a result
of the transfer, we cannot think the court abused its discretion
therein." The Supreme Court, in its opinion, left undetermined
what it would have done if the note and deed of trust had been
executed before one of the signers thereof had been inducted into
military service and if there had been a showing of financial handicap or necessary delay in making payments as a result of the
military service. It therefore is recommended that the attorney
conducting the proceedings take no chances on this point and that
he set out in the motion the facts regarding military service.
Reasonable diligence should be used by the person filing the
motion or his attorney in ascertaining the facts as to the military
service of each person named in the motion. It should not be overlooked that secs. 104 and 106 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act, which were added by the 1942 amendments (U.S.C.A.
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Title 50 Appendix secs. 514 and 516), extend the benefits of the
Act, respectively, to persons who serve with the forces of any
nation with which the United States may be allied in the prosecution of any war in which the United States engages while the Act
remains in force and who immediately prior to such service were
citizens of the United States (with certain exceptions which need
not be noticed in connection with the matters discussed in this
article) and to any person who has been ordered to report for induction under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940,
as amended. And, in the language used in the motion to negative
military service of any person, it should be stated not only that
such person is not and has not during the preceding three months
been in the military service of the United States but also that he
has not been ordered to report for induction under the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, and that he is not
serving and has not during the preceding three months served
with the forces of any nation with which the United States may
be allied in the prosecution of any war.
NAMES AND ADDRESSES

With respect to the names of the persons interested in the
real estate, whose interests would be cut out by the foreclosure
proceedings, and their addresses, which are to be stated in the
motion and to which names and addresses copies of the notice are
to be mailed by the clerk, it has already been stated herein that
such names and addresses are the same as those to which the
Public Trustee is required by the provisions of sec. 64, Ch. 40, 1935
C.S.A. to mail copies of the notice of sale. Therefore, reference is
made to the detailed discussion of the persons to whom the Public
Trustee should mail copies of the notice of the sale and their addresses to which the copies of the notice of sale should be mailed
which appears following the heading "Mailing of Copies of the
Notice of Sale" on pages 447 to 450 of this article.
Neither personal service of the notice of the hearing on the
motion nor publication in a newspaper of such notice is required.
The same reasons which make unnecessary the filing of an affidavit
as to military service or the appointment of an attorney to represent any persons who are or may be in military service under sec.
200 (1) of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (U.S.C.A.
Title 50 Appendix sec. 520 (1)) in a statutory proceeding for
determination of heirship (Real Estate Title Standard No. 34) or
in a proceeding for the probate of a will or for the sale of real
estate owned by a decedent at the time of his death (Real Estate
Title Standard No. 35) make unnecessary the appointment of such
an attorney in a proceeding under Rule 120.
In the opinion of the writer, no objection to the entering of
the order authorizing the sale is to be made to or considered by
the court which is not based upon the fact that a person, whose
interest in the real estate would be cut out by the foreclosure pro-
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ceeding, is in military service or was in military service within
the preceding three months; this statement is based upon the considerations already stated herein with respect to the advisability
of stating in the motion the facts that have been ascertained with
respect to military service of those named in the motion as having
interests in the property.
The return (report) of the sale is usually made by or on behalf of the person who filed the motion, but some attorneys have
such return made by the Public Trustee. Eeither of these practices is proper, since neither the Act nor the Rule specifies who is
to make the return and the essential elements are that the sale be
reported to the court and that it be approved by the court.
The fact that in this article the proceedings under Rule 120
are outlined and discussed before any mention is made of the proceedings in the foreclosure itself does not mean that the proceedings under Rule 120 must be carried through, or even commenced,
before the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale is filed with the
Public Trustee or proceedings for the sale are taken by the Public
Trustee. On the contrary, it is immaterial which of the two proceedings is started first; the important thing is that the order of
court authorizing the sale is entered before the sale is held by
the Public Trustee. The proceedings under the rule are not a part
of the proceedings for the foreclosure by sale under the deed of
trust; they are collateral proceedings which must be taken if the
title derived through the foreclosure is not to be considered unmarketable because of failure to comply with the requirements of
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act. They have been discussed herein before the foreclosure proceedings were taken up
merely because it was convenient to do so rather than to insert the
discussion of them in the midst of the outline and explanation of
the various steps in the foreclosure itself.
REPEAL OF OBSOLETE SECTIONS OF STATUTES

Secs. 70 to 75, inclusive, and sec. 77 of Ch. 40, 1935 C.S.A.
quite obviously were superseded by secs. 158 to 168 of the same
chapter, but they were not expressly repealed and were printed in
1935 C.S.A. with notes stating that the respective sections seem
to be superseded by certain sections of the later statute. To remedy
this situation, secs. 70 to 77, inclusive, were expressly repealed in
1951 (1951 S. L. 268) and sec. 76 was replaced by a new sec.
168 (a) (1951 S. L. 268) and therefore said secs. 70 to 77, inclusive,
are to be ignored.
THE NOTICE OF ELECTION AND DEMAND FOR SALE

The first step in the foreclosure by advertisement and sale
by the Public Trustee of a deed of trust is the presenting to the
Public Trustee of the deed of trust to be foreclosed, the note or
notes secured by it and a Notice of Election and Demand for Sale
in which the holder of the indebtedness declares a violation of one
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or more of the covenants of the deed of trust and elects that the
property therein described be advertised for sale; in view of the
fact that the 1925 statute (1925 Session Laws 516, 1935 C.S.A.
Ch. 40, sec. 64) provides that upon receipt of such Notice of Election and Demand for Sale-the Public Trustee shall securely paste
it in a book to be kept by him for that purpose and shall cause a
copy of it to be recorded in the Recorder's office, it is preferable
that such Notice of Election and Demand for Sale be presented in
duplicate, so that one of them can be recorded and the other pasted
by the Public Trustee in the book kept by him for that purpose,
although it would seem that, under the statute, if only one Notice
of Election and Demand for Sale is presented, the pasting of same
in the book of the Public Trustee and the making of a copy of it
and the recording of such copy will be sufficient.
After the presenting of the note or notes, the deed of trust
and the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale, the next steps to
be taken are, as above suggested, the pasting in the book kept by
the Public Trustee for that purpose of one of the duplicates or
the original of such-Notice of Election and Demand for Sale and
the recording in the Recorder's office of a duplicate or a copy of
same.
PREPARATION OF THE NOTICE OF SALE

Next comes the preparation of the Notice of Sale. This, ordinarily, consists of the filling in the blanks in the regular printed
form and is not complicated although care should be used that it
correctly names the parties to the deed of trust and correctly describes the deed of trust and the real estate covered by it, and
correctly states all other matters called for by the printed form,
and it states as the place where the sale will be held one which conforms with the place of sale stated in the deed of trust and that
the date stated as the date of the sale is one which permits publication of the notice for the required period.
Almost all of the deeds of trust to the Public Trustee executed
prior to the erection of the present City and County Building of
the City and County of Denver stated the place where the sale
should be held as the Tremont Street front door of the Court House
in the City and County of Denver or on the premises. Such Court
House has now been torn down and the new City and County
Building is the present Court House of the City and County of
Denver and to meet this situation there was passed a statute in
1933 which authorizes the sale under such a deed of trust to be
conducted at the Bannock Street main entrance to the new City
and County Building located on Civic Center in said City and
County of Denver and which further authorizes the sale under
any deed of trust to be conducted at any door, side or entrance
of the new Court House in cases where, since the execution of the
deed of trust, the Court House therein referred to has been destroyed or removed or the site thereof otherwise changed (1933
S. L. 793-795; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40, secs. 58-61).
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PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF SALE

Step number four is the publication of the Notice of Sale. The
statute (1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 69) says that all deeds of trust
shall prescribe a period of advertising notice of sale, weekly, in
some newspaper of general circulation which publication shall not
in any case be for less than four weeks. Of course, the advertisement of the sale by the Public Truste must be made for at least
the period specified in the deed of trust. Most deeds of trust provide for four weeks' public notice of the time and place of the sale
to be given by advertisement weekly in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the County in which the real estate is situated, but the provision in the particular deed of trust regarding
advertisement should be examined to make sure that it does not
require a longer period of publication than four weeks and that
it does not require publication more often than once a week. If
publication is to be made four weeks, it must be borne in mind
that publication in four consecutive weekly issues will not be
sufficient but that the publication must be made at least once a
week for five successive weeks, since the statute (1935 C.S.A. Ch.
130 sec. 6, which is contained in the chapter relating to Printing,
Advertisements and Newspapers) provides: "Where publication
for four weeks is required, then publication once each week for
five successive weeks in any daily, weekly, semi-weekly or triweekly newspaper shall be sufficient."
MAILING OF COPIES OF THE NOTICE OF SALE

The fifth step is the one in which the greatest care must be
used. More titles have been objected to because of defects occurring
in this stage of the foreclosure than in any other stage of the proceedings. The step referred to is the mailing of copies of the
Notice of Sale. Many persons whose title or interest in or lien
upon the property is to be cut out by the foreclosure do not reside
in the County where the property is located at the time of the
publication of the notice or, if they do, they may not see the notice
in the newspaper and, for this reason, our Legislature has provided that a printed copy of the Notice of Sale is to be mailed to
each person whose title or interest is to be cut out by the foreclosure, if his address appears on the records.
The importance of the greatest care being used to follow the
provisions of the statute in the mailing of the copies of the Notice
of Sale cannot be emphasized too strongly because, as already
stated, if the provisions of the statute in this regard are not strictly
followed, the entire foreclosure proceeding may be rendered defective and all of the time and work put in the foreclosure proceeding and all of the expense will have gone for naught. The publication of the Notice of Sale and the mailing of copies of such Notice are the very heart of the foreclosure proceeding and, just as
the service of summons in a lawsuit is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court to enter the judgment, so the publication and
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mailing of copies of the Notice of Sale in strict compliance with
the provisions of the statute are necessary to confer power on the
Public Trustee to sell the property.
The latest statute on the mailing of copies of the Notice of
Sale was passed in 1925 (1925 S. L. 516, 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec.
64). It provides that the Public Trustee shall mail a printed copy
of the Notice of Sale within ten days from the date of the first
publication thereof to the grantor or grantors at the address given
in the trust deed and that he shall also mail a like notice to each
and every person who appears to have acquired a record interest
in said real estate subsequent to the recording of said trust deed,
whether by deed, mortgage, judgment or any other instrument of
record; and that such notice shall be mailed to such person, or
persons, at the address given in the recorded instrument of writing;
also that if such recorded instrument of writing does not give such
address it will not be necessary to mail any notice to the particular
person or persons whose address is not so given, provided, however,
that where only the county and state is given as the address of
such person, or persons, then such printed notice shall be mailed
to the county seat of such county; and provided further, that it
will not be necessary to mail a copy of said printed notice to any
person whose interest does not appear of record at the time said
Notice of Election and Demand for Sale is recorded.
MAILING To GRANTOR

Let us examine in some detail the foregoing statutory provisions. First, as to the mailing of copy of the notice to the person
or persons who executed the deed of trust which is being foreclosed.
The deed of trust usually contains the address of the person or
persons who executed it and the copy of the notice should be mailed
to each such person at his address so stated in the deed of trust.
If the deed of trust, however, merely names him as of a certain
county and state, then the copy of the notice should be mailed to
him at the county seat of that county. For instance, if, instead of
giving a more specific address, the deed of trust merely described
John Jones, who was the maker of the trust deed, as being of the
County of Arapahoe, in the State of Colorado, the copy of the
notice should be mailed to John Jones, Littleton, Colorado, Littleton being the county seat of Arapahoe County.
In order that the Public Trustee may know the names of all
persons who appear to have acquired a record interest in the property subsequent to the recording of the deed of trust which is
being foreclosed, whether such record interest was acquired by
deed, mortgage, judgment, mechanic's lien statement or any other
instrument of record, either the abstract of title should be certified by an abstract company down to and including the recording
of the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale or there should be
furnished by an abstract company a supplemental abstract showing all instruments recorded affecting the property from the re-
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cording of the deed of trust which is being foreclosed to and including the recording of the Notice of Election and Demand for
Sale or there should be secured from an abstract company a certificate' showing the names of all persons who have acquired a
record interest in the property by instruments recorded during
such period and showing the book and page where each instrument
was recorded by which such interest was acquired. A copy of the
printed Notice of Sale should be mailed to each person who so
acquired a record interest in the property subsequent to the recording of the deed of trust which is being foreclosed and it should
be mailed to the address of each such person as such address appears in the recorded instrument by which each such person
acquired his record interest in the property, that is, the deed to
such person, the mortgage to such person, the deed of trust securing a note payable to such person, the transcript of judgment in
favor of such person, the mechanic's lien statement filed by such
person or the instrument, of whatever character it may be, through
which such person appears to have a record interest in the property. If, as is often the case, such recorded instrument does not
give any specific address of such person but merely describes him
as being of a certain county and state, then the copy of the notice
should be mailed to him at the county seat of that county in the
same manner as already mentioned with reference to the maker
of the deed of trust where his residence was described in the same
manner.
WHERE NEW AND PRESENT ADDRESS IS KNOWN

Even though it may, as a matter of fact, be known that any
of the persons to whom notice is to be mailed has moved from the
address given in the deed of trust or other recorded instrument and
even though his new and present address may be known, that does
not do away with the necessity of mailing the notice to him at his
address as given in the deed of trust or the recorded deed or other
instrument through which he acquired his record interest. And
even though there may be known the definite city or street or
R. F. D. address of any such person to whom notice is to be mailed
but whose address is stated in the deed of trust or other recorded
instrument only by describing him as being of a certain county
and state, that does not do away with the necessity of mailing the
notice to him at the county seat of that county. The requirements
of the statute must be complied with no matter what may be
known as to his present address. The fact that the person to whom
is mailed the notice addressed to him at his present address actually received the notice at such address, does not prevent the
proceeding from being defective on its face because of failure to
mail it to him at his address as given in the recorded instrument.
The merchantability of a title depends on what the records show
and not on what facts in favor of the validity of the title may be
found to exist upon an investigation outside of the records. How-
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ever, in any of such cases where the present address of any such
person is known and is different from the address to which, under
the terms of the statute, the notice is to be mailed, it would be well
to mail the notice to him at his present address in addition to mailing a notice to him at the address given in the trust deed or other
recorded instrument. It will only incur the extra expense of a
postage stamp to do so and will be in the interest of fair play to
give him actual notice of the sale. And, for the same reasons, it
might be well, although perhaps not necessary to the validity of
the sale, to endeavor to secure the actual specific present address
of each person to whom a copy of the notice is to be mailed in order
that all may be done that can reasonably be done under the circumstances to get actual notice of the sale to each person whose interests are to be cut out by the foreclosure.
Of course, as is expressly provided by the statute, if the address of any person who acquired a subsequent record interest is
not stated in any manner in any recorded instrument, no copy of the
Notice of Sale need be mailed to him; however, if the actual present address of such person is known, it would be well that a copy
of the printed notice be mailed to him at that address in order
that he may receive actual notice of the sale.
THE OLD STATUTE

The statute which has been discussed containing the provisions
for the mailing of the notice of sale was passed in 1925 and went
into Pffeat on June 26, 1925. The statute regarding this matter
which existed up to that time was passed in 1894 and the provision which it contained regarding the mailing of notice of sale
by the Public Trustee was as follows: "The Trustee shall mail a
copy of the printed notice of sale so soon as the same shall be
printed, to the grantor and all subsequent encumbrancers at the
address given in the trust deed without extra charge." (Sec. 5050
1921 C. L.). And a provision in this language is contained in most
of the deeds of trust executed prior to the taking effect of the new
law and, in fact, many deeds of trust which have been executed
since 1925 contained the same provision. There may be a question
as to whether this provision, being contained in the deed of trust,
was not thereby made a part of the contract between the parties
which could not be changed by the 1925 law and therefore whether,
in foreclosing a deed of trust executed prior to June 26, 1925, or
executed subsequent to that date and containing the same provision which was contained in the 1894 statute, the notice of sale
should not be mailed in the manner set out in such provision. It
will be noted that this provision is that not only is the notice of
sale to be mailed to the grantor at the address given in the trust
deed but also that the notice must be mailed to all "subsequent
encumbrancers" at the same address, to-wit: the address given
in the trust deed; this means that the notice mailed to each person
who acquired a record interest in the property subsequent to the
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execution of the trust deed which is being foreclosed should be
mailed to him at the address which the maker of the deed of trust
stated in the trust deed as being his own address; it may sound
foolish to mail a notice to someone who acquired a subsequent
record interest in the property from the maker of the deed of trust
by mailing such notice to such person who acquired the subsequent
interest addressed to him at the address of the person from whom
he acquired his interest, but this is the meaning of the old statute.
Therefore, in the foreclosure of deeds of trust which were executed
before June 26, 1925, or which, although executed after that date,
nevertheless contained the provision above mentioned which was
contained in the old statute, it is best, in order to avoid any question on the matter, that both the old statute and the new one be
complied with and that the notice mailed to each person who acquired a record interest in the property subsequent to the execution of the deed of trust should be mailed to him at the address
given in the deed of trust as the address of the maker of the deed
of trust and that another copy of the notice be mailed to him at his
address as given in the recorded instrument by which he acquired
his record interest in the property. It is better to mail out too
many notices rather than too few; it can do no harm to mail too
many, but if a notice is not mailed to one person at an address to
which it should be, the proceeding may be rendered defective. It
is better to be safe than sorry.
WHEN NOTICES ARE TO BE MAILED

Under the 1925 law the notices are to be mailed within ten days
after the first publication. Under the law which existed prior to
1925 the notices were to be mailed "so soon as the same shall be
printed." Therefore, in the foreclosure of a deed of trust executed
prior to June 26, 1925, or executed after that date and containing
the provision that the notice of sale shall be mailed "so soon as
the same shall be printed" it is advisable, in order to avoid any
question on the matter, for the Public Trustee to mail out the
notices immediately upon their being printed instead of waiting
almost ten days after the first publication to do so.
The Public Trustee should, after he has mailed the printed
copies of the notice, make and sign a certificate of his having
mailed the printed copies of the notice in which he states the
name of each person to whom he mailed a printed copy of the notice of sale and the address of each person to which he mailed the
same and the date he mailed the same and such certificate should
be carefully preserved either by pasting it in the book or by keeping
it in the file of that foreclosure. A printed copy of the notice of
sale should be pasted in the same book in which the Notice of
Election and Demand for Sale is pasted, preferably on the same
page. The affidavit of the publisher of the newspaper showing the
publication of the notice of sale should be furnished by such publisher to the Public Trustee and carefully preserved by the Public
Trustee.
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CALCULATION OF PRINCIPAL, INTEREST AND EXPENSES

So much for the proceedings preliminary to the sale. Shortly
before the sale is to be held there should be figured up the amount
due and unpaid on the note or notes, principal and interest, and
any amount due for taxes paid with interest thereon and the fees
of the Public Trustee in the matter (which are fixed by 1935
C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40 sec. 56) and the expenses of the proceedings,
including recording fees, abstract fees, publisher's charges, attorney's fees and other expenses, if any.
ATTORNEY'S FEES

It is customary that the deed of trust contain a provision to the
effect that if foreclosure be made by the Public Trustee an attorney's fee in an amount specified in the deed of trust for services
in the supervision of the foreclosure proceedings shall be allowed
by the Public Trustee as a part of the costs of foreclosure. If the
deed of trust being foreclosed contains such a provision and if the
foreclosure proceedings are being supervised by an attorney on
behalf of the holder of the note secured by said deed of trust and
if such holder of the note has paid or agreed to pay the attorney
a reasonable attorney's fee in an amount not in excess of that
specified in the note or deed of trust, it is proper to include as a
part of the expense of the foreclosure such attorney's fee. But the
Supreme Court of Colorado has held that such provisions in a
note or an instrument securing a note for the allowance of attorney's fees are to indemnify the creditor against the expenses incurred in the employing of an attorney and not to enrich the
creditor (Florence 0. and R. Co. v. Hiawatha G. 0. and R. Co., 55
Colo. 378,382, 135 Pac. 454; Jones v. First National Bank, 74 Colo.
140, 142, 219 Pac. 780 ;Denver L. & M. Co. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.,
96 Colo. 21, 23, 39 Pac. (2d) 1036). Therefore if, as often is the
case, the foreclosure proceedings are supervised only by the holder
of the note or by his agent (who is not an attorney) or such proceedings are handled entirely by the Public Trustee without any
supervision, go that, in any of such cases, they are not supervised
by any attorney, then the Public Trustee must not include any
attorney's fee as part of the expenses of the foreclosure, even
though the deed of trust or note contains the said provision for
an attorney's fee.
CONDUCT OF SALE

At the time and place named in the printed notice of sale as
the time and place where the sale will be held the Public Trustee
should read aloud the printed notice of sale and then call for bids.
Almost invariably, the only bidder at the sale is the holder of the
indebtedness secured by the deed of trust and he usually bids an
amount which may be less than but which is not greater than the
amount which is secured by the trust deed plus the fees and expenses of the foreclosure. After all have bid who wish to, the
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Public Trustee should strike off the property to the person making
the only bid or the person making the highest bid, if there be
more than one bidder, and the Public Trustee should then declare
that he has sold the property described in the notice of sale to
that person at the price which he bid, naming such price. The
Public Trustee's fees and expenses of the sale are to be paid to
him in cash immediately after he has declared the property to
have been sold; if the successful bidder is the owner of the indebtedness secured by the deed of trust, the balance of the amount of
his bid is not paid in cash to the Public Trustee but is by the
Public Trustee applied upon the indebtedness secured by the trust
deed. If the highest bidder is not the holder of the debt secured
by the trust deed, the full amount of the bid must be paid in cash.
ADJOURNMENT OR POSTPONEMENT OF SALE

The decisions of the courts are in conflict as to the period
during which notice of the adjournment or postponement of the
sale by Public Trustee is to be published in cases where the sale
is not held at the time stated in the original published notice of
sale, but is postponed or adjourned (59 C.J.S. 956). The courts of
some states have held that where the sale is adjourned not only
must there be oral announcement of the adjournment at the time
and place stated in the original notice, but also the notice of the
adjournment thereof must be published for the same length of
time that is required for the publication of the original notice of
sale (which, under the Colorado statutes, would be at least once
a week for five successive weeks), but other courts have held that
this is not necessary provided the notice of the adjournment is such
a notice as will give reasonable publicity and is given in good faith
and contains all the requisites of a notice of sale. The Colorado
appellate courts have not ruled upon this question, and therefore it
cannot be said which of the two conflicting rules the Colorado
Supreme Court would adopt. Under these conditions, the safe
course to follow in the event that the sale is to be postponed 6r
adjourned is for the Public Trustee to make, at the time and place
of sale stated in the original published notice, oral announcement
that the sale is adjourned to a certain hour and date (which will
allow five weekly subsequent publications) at the same place and
then have published at least once a week for five successive weeks
the original notice of sale reading exactly as it read when it was
previously published, together with and below same a notice signed
by the Public Trustee stating the above sale has been adjourned
to and will be held at a certain time and place which are specified
in detail in such notice of adjournment.
Upon making the sale, the Public Trustee should enter in a
book kept by him for that purpose a record of the name of the
person or persons who executed the deed of trust, the date of the
trust deed, a brief description of the property therein described,
the date of sale, the name of the newspaper printing the notice of
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the sale, the name and last postoffice address of the purchaser at
the sale and the amount at which the property was sold in separate
parcels if so sold or en masse (1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 64).
THE CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE

The Public Trustee should then issue in duplicate a Certificate
of Purchase. In doing this, the customary printed form prepared
for that purpose should be carefully filled in and then both copies
of the Certificate of Purchase should be signed by him. One of
such duplicates should be plainly marked "Original" and the other
should be marked "Duplicate." The original of the Certificate of
Purchase should be delivered to the purchaser and, within ten
days from the sale, the Public Trustee should file for record in
the office of the Recorder the duplicate of the Certificate of Purchase and such duplicate should be returned to the Public Trustee
by the Recorder after it has been recorded and should be preserved
in his files (1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 168). The Certificate of Purchase should be carefully checked over before the original of it is
delivered to the purchaser and the duplicate is recorded.
The statute, as it existed prior to 1931, provided that the Certificate of Purchase shall state the time when the purchaser shall
be entitled to a deed to the property unless the same shall be redeemed (sec. 5052 1921 C. L.; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 70). However,
in 1931 a new statute was passed (1931 Session Laws 698; 1935
C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 168) which provides that the Certificate of
Purchase shall state "that the purchaser shall be entitled to a deed
of such lands and tenements at the expiration of the periods of
redemption provided for by law unless the same shall be redeemed
as provided for by law"; both the old and the new statutes also
provide that the Certificate of Purchase shall describe the lands
and tenements purchased and the sum paid therefor; it is the practice, however, that other details concerning the deed of trust and
the sale be stated in the Certificate of Purchase, and this practice
is a good one as it serves to identify the deed of trust under which
the sale was had and to summarize the proceedings in connection
with the sale; and, in fact, as appears more fully in the third
paragraph of the subdivision of this article entitled "Issuance of
Public Trustee's Deed on pages 457-458 of this article, it is advisable that such other details be set out in the Certificate of Purchase
if they are not to be set out in the Public Trustee's Deed.
REDEMPTION FROM SALE

Unless a redemption is made within the period provided by
law, nothing further need be done until the expiration of the period
of redemption. Upon the expiration of the period allowed by law
for redemption from the sale, then, if no redemption shall have
been made during such period, a Public Trustee's Deed is to be
executed upon the surrender of the original of the Certificate of
Purchase.
The law as it existed from 1894 to 1929 (secs, 5053-5057 1921
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C. L.; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 secs. 71-75) allowed to the maker of the
deed of trust and his assigns and holders of subsequent encumbrances six months after the sale in which to redeem and allowed
judgment creditors of the owner of the property three months
after the expiration of such six months in which to redeem, so
that, under that law, the period of redemption did not expire until
nine months after the sale and therefore, under that law, Public
Trustee's Deed should not be issued until the expiration of such
nine months. However, in Finch v. Turner, 21 Colo. 287, 291, 40
Pac. 565, it was held that under that law a Sheriff's Deed upon a
sale under execution may, as to the judgment debtor and his
grantee, issue at any time after the expiration of six months, and
in McLaughlin v. Wilson, 23 Colo. App. 59, 61-62, 127 Pac. 242
this ruling was followed in a similar case under the same law and
the Court further held that, it not appearing from the record that
any judgment creditor had made effort to redeem the land from the
sale after the six months and within nine months therefrom, it will
be presumed that no such redemption was attempted.
PRESENT REDEMPTION STATUTE

By a law passed in 1929 (1929 Session Laws 538) which took
effect August 1, 1929, and an amendment thereto passed in 1931
(1931 Sessions Laws 696; such 1929 law and the 1931 amendments
being secs. 158-168 Ch. 40 1935 C.S.A.) a change was made
with respect to the period of redemption; the 1929 and 1931 laws
give the owner of the property the same six months from the date
of the sale in which to redeem, and give the same period to a person who might be liable on a deficiency, but, as to redemption by
persons having encumbrances or liens upon the property, they
provide that such persons must, in order to redeem, file within the
said period of six months from the sale with the officer who made
the sale a notice of intention to redeem and that, in case any such
notice of intention to redeem is so filed within such six months,
the encumbrancee or lienor first in priority who shall have filed
such notice of intention to redeem shall have ten days after the
expiration of said six months in which to redeem and each subsequent encumbrancee or lienor in succession shall have a five-day
period thereafter to redeem according to the priority of his lien or
encumbrance. Therefore, in the case of a foreclosure of a deed
of trust executed after August 1, 1929, a Public Trustee's Deed
can be issued immediately after the expiration of six months from
the sale if no redemption was made during such six months by
the owner of the property or by a person who might be liable on a
deficiency and if no encumbrancee or lienor has during such si'x
months filed with the Public Trustee a notice of his intention to
redeem.
As to the issuance of a Public Trustee's Deed on foreclosure
of a deed of trust executed prior to August 1, 1929 (when the new
redemption statute took effect), the situation is not as clear or
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definite. Although it has been held by the authorities already
cited that, as against the judgment debtor or his grantees, a
Sheriff's Deed on sale on execution was valid even under the old
statute when it was issued after the expiration of six months and
before the expiration of nine months from the date of the Sheriff's
sale, the Supreme Court has held that under the old statute the
owner of the property has the right to the possession of the property until the expiration of the nine months' period after the sale
(Lane v. Morris, 77 Colo. 343, 346, 237 Pac. 154: Carson v. Bradford, 91 Colo. 434, 438, 15 Pac. (2d) 977) and the Supreme Court
has said that, after the six-months'period of redemption, there were
two valuable rights still available to the maker of the deed of
trust, namely: possession of the premises until the deed of the
Public Trustee was actually executed and the right to have the
premises redeemed by a judgment creditor of his (Farmers', etc.
Association v. San Luis State Bank, 86 Colo. 293, 302, 281 Pac.
366) and, because of these holdings, a number of attorneys have
been of the opinion that under the old law there might be considered to be a vested right in the owner of property, who executed
a deed of trust prior to August 1, 1929, to have the full nine months
expire after the sale before his rights to the possession of the property are cut off and before the rights of his judgment creditors to
redeem are cut off; and such attorneys have been of the opinion
that it might be held that such vested rights can not be affected
or cut out by a law passed after the execution of the deed of trust
and that therefore the provisions of the old statute as to redemption apply to sales made under deeds of trust executed before
August 1, 1929, even though such sales are not made until after
that date. Therefore, to avoid any question on this point it is
suggested that, in cases of foreclosures of deeds of trust which
were executed before August 1, 1929, Public Trustee's Deed be
not executed until after the expiration of the full period of nine
months from the date of the sale.
Sec. 205 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940
(which section was placed in the Act by the the 1942 Amendments)
provides that no part of the period of military service which occurs
after the date of the enactment of the 1942 Amendments shall be
included in computing any period then or thereafter provided by
any law for the redemption of real property sold (U.S.C.A. Title 50
Appendix sec. 525). Therefore, if any person who, during the
regular six months period of redemption, was entitled to redeem
was in military service during any part of such six months his
right to redeem may continue until after expiration of the period of
his military service, even though it be after the expiration of the
six months and so, in such case, he may redeem even though the
Public Trustee's deed has been executed, delivered and recorded
and purchaser has taken possession. This fact, however, need not
prevent the Public Trustee's deed being executed, delivered and
recorded at the time when it might have been if the Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act had not been enacted.
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ASSIGNMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF PURCHASE

In case the Certificate of Purchase has been assigned, such
assignment should be in writing signed by the purchaser upon the
original of the certificate of purchase (new sec. 168 (a) added to
ch. 40, 1935 C.S.A. by 1951 S. L. 268). While not absolutely necessary, it is advisable, in case the Certificate of Purchase has been
assigned, to have the assignment on the original of the Certificate
of Purchase acknowledged and to have such original of the Certificate of Purchase with the assignment thereon recorded in the
office of the Recorder in order that the records of the Recorder
and the abstract of title shall show such assignment. The Public
Trustee should be advised of the assignment and he thereupon
should make a note of it on his records.
ISSUANCE OF PUBLIC TRUSTEE'S DEED

After the expiration of the period of redemption provided by
the law applicable to the sale without any redemption having been
made, the Public Trustee is to execute and deliver a Public Trustee's
Deed (1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40 sec. 164). Such deed can be prepared by carefully filling in the blanks in the customary form of
Public Trustee's Deed and signing and acknowledging it. Care
should be taken to check it over and see that it is properly and
accurately filled in and is properly signed and acknowledged. It
is to be made to the holder of the Certificate of Purchase or, in case
a redemption has been made by a lienor, to the lienor last redeeming.
In a number of decisions the Colorado Court of Appeals said
that, irrespective of whether or not the deed of trust contains a
provision to that effect, the recitals in the Trustee's Deed are prima
facie proof of the matters stated in them (see decisions cited in
Scott v. Lambert, 24 Colo. App. 260, 263-264, 132 Pac. 1145) ; in
a later decision the Court of Appeals said that this rule is limited
to recitals which it is a part of the duties of the officer to make
and which are material to the execution of the trust (Page v. Gillett,
26 Colo. App. 204, 205, 141 Pac. 866). Both the old statute (sec.
5052, 1921 C. L.; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 70) and the 1931 statute
(1931 Session Laws 698; 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 168) provide that
the Certificate of Purchase or a certified copy thereof shall be
taken and deemed evidence of the facts therein contained. A new
sec. 163 (2) which has been added to Ch. 40 1935 C.S.A. provides
that the Public Trustee's Deed shall be prima facie evidence not
only of the recitals therein contained but also of the compliance
with all of the statutory requirements for the sale and of the execution of the deed (1951 S. L. 269).
In Knox v. Gibson, 23 Colo. App. 402, 403-405, 128 Pac. 470,
it was held that a Trustee's Deed was invalid where it did not recite
the making of a request by the legal owner or holder of the note to
have the deed of trust foreclosed, the date on which the publication of the foreclosure notice was begun, or how long the same was
published or in what newspaper it appeared. However, in that
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case the deed of trust foreclosed was one executed to a private
trustee prior to the enactment in 1894 of the law creating the office of Public Trustee in each county of the state and, therefore,
in that case no Certificate of Purchase was issued by the trustee,
there was no period of redemption after the sale and the Trustee's
Deed passed upon was executed and delivered immediately after
the sale was held, as was stated in the second paragraph of this
article. So that, in Knox v. Gibson, there was no instrument executed by the Trustee, other than the Trustee's Deed, in which he
could set out the recitals, the omission of which the Court of
Appeals held invalidated the Trustee's Deed. For this reason, the
decision in Knox v. Gibson cannot be considered as a precedent for
holding invalid a Public Trustee's Deed which does not contain
the recitals mentioned in such decision if the Certificate of Purchase issued by the Public Trustee set out such recitals. So long
as such recitals are set out in an instrument which is required by
the statute to be executed by the Public Trustee and which has been
recorded in the office of the Recorder, it should be immaterial
whether that instrument - be the Certificate of Purchase or the
Public Trustee's Deed. In some counties (including the City and
County of Denver) such recitals are contained in the Certificate
of Purchase and not in the Public Trustee's Deed, and in other
counties in the state they are not contained in the Certificate of
Purchase but are set out in the Public Trustee's Deed and, for the
reasons already mentioned, either course is proper.
Now NECESSARY?
It may be that, by virtue of the 1951 statute, which has been
mentioned (1951 S. L. 269) which enacted a new sec. 163 (2) Ch.
40 1935 C.S.A. which provides for the first time that the Public
Trustee's Deed shall be prima facie evidence of the compliance
with all of the statutory requirements for the sale and of the execution of the deed, it is no longer necessary that the recitals mentioned in Knox v. Gibson be set out either in the Certificate of
Purchase or in the Public Trustee's Deed. However, it is suggested
that, in order to play safe on this point, until this question has
been decided by our Supreme Court, there be set out in either the
Certificate of Purchase or the Public Trustee's Deed recitals of the
filing and recording of the Notice of Election and Demand for Sale,
the date of the first publication of the Notice of Sale, at what
intervals it was published, the date of the last publication, the
name of the newspaper in which it was published, the name of the
county in which the newspaper was published, the name and address of each person to whom a copy of the notice of sale was
mailed and the fact that such mailing was done within ten days
after the first publication, as well as other customary recitals contained in the printed forms.
The Public Trustee's Deed should not be executed and delivered until there has been surrendered to the Public Trustee the
ARE THE RECITALS
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original of the Certificate of Purchase; except that, if the holder
of the Certificate of Purchase shall have lost the same, then, as
provided by 1935 C.S.A. Ch. 40 sec. 80, he is to notify at once the
Public Trustee of such loss and is also to give public notice in a
newspaper of general circulation published in the county wher6
the property described in the Certificate of Purchase is situated
at least once a week for eight consecutive weeks and, upon his
having done so and upon his giving to the Public Trustee a bond
in a sum double the amount of that named in the Certificate of
Purchase, which bond is to be approved by the Public Trustee, the
Public Trustee may issue a duplicate Certificate of Purchase (which
must bear upon its face the word "duplicate" in red ink) and such
duplicate can be surrendered to the Public Trustee with the same
effect as the surrender of the original, when a redemption has been
made and the redemption money is to be paid over or when a Public
Trustee's Deed is to be issued.
Under no circumstances should the issuance of the Public
Trustee's Deed be delayed beyond the period of nine months after
the expiration of the last period of redemption allowed by the
statutes. This is because 1935 C.S.A. Suppl. Ch. 40 secs. 164 and
164 (1) (1937 S. L. 472-475) provides that, if no Public Trustee's
Deed is issued during such nine months, the Public Trustee shall
not have the power to issue the Public Trustee's Deed and the holder
of the Certificate of Purchase shall have only a lien upon the property, which lien shall continue until the expiration of fifteen months
after the expiration of the last period of redemption, and that
such lien may be enforced only by a court action to foreclose it
in the method provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages
and that, after the expiration of such fifteen months, if no such
action has been commenced and no lis pendens of such action has
been filed, it shall conclusively be presumed that such lien has been
paid and discharged. See Green v. Hoefler, 115 Colo. 287, 173 Pac.
(2d) 208.
Under the Federal Revenue Law revenue stamps must be
affixed to the Public Trustee's Deed in the amount of fifty-five
cents of revenue stamps for each five hundred dollars or fraction
thereof of the amount for which the property was sold at the sale.
These revenue stamps should be affixed by the Public Trustee to
the deed and should be cancelled by him.
And the final step in the foreclosure is the filing of the Public
Trustee's Deed for record with the Recorder of the County in which
is located the real estate covered by the foreclosure.
JUNIOR LIENS HELD BY UNITED STATES

A word of caution in closing. In situations where the records
show the existence of a lien or encumbrance held by the United
States (for example, a recorded notice of lien for unpaid income,
social security or excise taxes or a Title 505 combination FHA
and GI loan, the junior part of which has been taken over by the
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United States) which is junior to the deed of trust about to be
foreclosed, consideration should be given to the advisability of
the foreclosure being made by an action in court rather than by
sale by the Public Trustee. This is because the United States has,
by U.S.C.A. Title 28 sec. 2410, given its consent to be made i
party to such a court action and because, under the provisions of
that section, the judicial sale of the property in such action will
have the same effect respecting the discharge of the property from
the lien or encumbrance held by the United States as it would
have if such lien or encumbrance were held by an individual or a
private corporation. It is to be noted that said sec. 2410 provides
that, where the sale of real estate in such action is made to satisfy
a lien prior to that of the United States, the United States shall
have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem.

SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

Rule 118 (c) is hereby amended to read as follows:
A petition for rehearing shall bear the cover endorsement
prescribed in Rule 115 (h), the name of the justice who wrote
the opinion, and shall state whether the decision was en banc or
in department. It may be filed within 15 days after the filing of
the opinion of the court, and shall briefly state the points claimed
to have been over-looked or misapprehended by the court with
proper references to the particular portion of the record and briefs
relied upon. Such petition may be printed, mimeographed or typewritten and shall not contain more than three pages without consent of the court, and be accompanied by seven legible copies thereof. In no case will any argument be permitted in support of such
petition. If argumentative matter is contained therein, the petition
may be stricken. No answer will be permitted and no action will
be taken save to grant or deny the rehearing. The filing of such
petition shall suspend proceedings under the decision until the
petition is disposed of, unless the court shall direct otherwise. This
amended rule to be applicable to all opinions of this court announced on or after November 19, 1951.
Adopted November 15, 1951.

HAVE TIMES CHANGED?
An historian of the Denver Bar Association, once wrote of
an annual Banquet held by this Association, "In 1921 Albert J.
Beveridge of Indiana, speaking on the subject 'John Marshall,'
held the attention of his audience four hours and, had he so desired, could have held it until daylight."

